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ABSTRACT
Analyses of mutual fund fees have differed over whether fees are
responsive to the forces of competition. Some academic and legal scholars
argue that because mutual fund markets possess some of the indicia of
competitive markets, fees must approximate marginal costs and thus cannot
be excessive. Others argue that structural anomalies in mutual fund
governance allow fund managers to overcharge mutual fund investors. This
Paper resolves the disagreement. It presents compelling evidence that
investment management fees, a major component of total fees are immune
to the forces of competition. This is accomplished with a combination of
financial and legal analysis.
We survey the universe of mutual fund assets and fees over time. We
find that between 2005 and 2015 total expense ratios declined; principally
because investors allocated an increased proportion of their funds to
passively managed open-end and exchange traded funds. However, over the
same period assets on actively managed open-end funds more than doubled
while investment management fees, also known as advisory fees increased
slightly. This outcome is inexplicable in economic terms but consistent with
the legal environment the investment management industry operates in.
Indeed, we show how the industry has shaped the environment.
The genesis of the fee anomaly is the 1970 Amendment to the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Studies by the Wharton School and the
SEC showed investment management fees higher than fees subject to
competitive forces. The Commission recommended that advisory fees
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should be “reasonable” and enforceable in court. The investment
management industry pushed back against this recommendation and
successfully killed the Commission’s proposal, following which Congress,
the Commission, and the industry crafted a “compromise” that made
investment advisers fiduciaries with respect to fees and gave investors a
private cause of action.
As evidenced by the inelasticity of management fees, the purported
solution to the problem was ineffective. We show how Congress signaled
its endorsement of the status quo and how the courts have interpreted the
Congressional signal: cases up to and including the recent Supreme Court
decision in Jones v. Harris have been uniformly negative for plaintiffs. No
plaintiff has ever received an award under the 36(b) statute.
As a result of the industry-favoring political and judicial environment,
investors in actively managed mutual funds are overcharged by about $30
billion per year. The investment management firms who sponsor and brand
actively managed mutual funds earn monopoly profits and excess returns for
their owners.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial services sector grew from 4.9% to 8.3% of GDP
between 1980 and 2006.2 Malkiel attributes a large proportion of this growth
to increases in the fees paid for asset management.3 He notes that “perhaps
the greatest inefficiency in the stock market is in ‘the market’ for investment
advice . . . . [T]he scale economies in asset management appear to have been
entirely captured by the asset managers.”4
Mutual fund fees are a primary cause of the well-documented
underperformance of actively managed funds versus index funds.5 Carhart
found that persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction
costs explain almost all of the predictability of mutual fund returns.6 A recent
study published by Morningstar updated and confirmed these results.7
On the surface, the mutual fund industry seems to correspond closely to
the model of perfect competition: a large number of buyers and sellers, no
significant barriers to entry or exit, perfect information, and a homogeneous
product. Traditional economic analysis argues that competitively
determined prices will equal marginal costs and thus cannot be excessive.
However, there is substantial disagreement about mutual fund fees in
the literature. While some scholars argue that there is a lack of price
competition among funds,8 other’s present evidence that the mutual fund
industry behaves competitively.9 The academic literature largely ignores the
2. Burton G. Malkiel, Asset Management Fees and the Growth of Finance, 27 J. ECON.
PERSP. 2 (Spring 2013), at 97.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 98-99.
5. See Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 80
(1997) (finding that load fees, expense ratios, and portfolio turnover are significantly and
negatively related to performance).
6. Id. at 57.
7. Russel Kinnel, Predictive Power of Fees: Why Mutual Fund Fees are so Important,
MORNINGSTAR MANAGER RES. May 2016,
http://corporate1.morningstar.com/ResearchArticle.aspx?documentId=752589 (finding that
the cheapest quintile funds were three times as likely to succeed as the priciest quintile).
8. See e.g., John A. Haslem et al., Are Retail S&P 500 Index Funds a Financial
Commodity? Insights for Investors, 15 FIN. SERV. REV. 99 (2006) (concluding there is a lack
of price competition after finding a high level of dispersion in expense ratios across retail S&P
500 Index funds); Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation Between Price and
Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153 (2009) (discovering that funds with
worse before-fee performance charge higher fees); Laurent Barras et al., False Discoveries in
Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas, 65 J. FIN. 179 (2010)
(finding that seventy-five percent of funds showed no positive return net of fees).
9. See e.g., Ajay Khorana et al., Mutual Fund Fees Around the World, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1279 (2009) (finding that differences in fees can be explained by a combination of
investment objective, size of fund, geographic distribution of fund, and degree of government
investor protection); Sunil Wahal & Albert Wang, Competition Among Mutual Funds, 99 J.
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legal and regulatory milieu in which mutual funds and mutual fund managers
operate. An examination of the legal issues yields important insights into
the impact of the legal and regulatory environment on mutual fund
“markets.”
The purpose of this Paper is to explore mutual fund fees in depth. It
resolves the disagreement about competition in mutual fund “markets” by
demonstrating that an important component of fund fees is immune to the
forces of competition. It accomplishes this with a combination of economic
and legal analysis.
In Part I, we study asset and fee levels of the universe of mutual funds
between 2005 and 2015. Using the Morningstar Direct database, we
examine changes in assets and asset-weighted expenses of funds
disaggregated by open-end, closed-end, exchange traded (ETF), active,
passive and money market. More importantly, we disaggregate the Total
Expense Ratio (TER) on actively managed open-end funds and find strong
evidence that management (advisory) fees, a component of the TER, are
immune to the forces of competition. We trace this immunity to the 1970
amendments10 to the Investment Company Act11 and analyze the cases that
have interpreted it.
Part II explores the legal and regulatory underpinnings of advisory fees
and sorts out the factors that mitigate against competitive forces. Unlike
most corporations, mutual funds have no employees or physical assets.
Instead, mutual funds are essentially a collection of contracts with services
providers, the most important of which is the investment management firm12
that creates, brands and manages the fund’s portfolio.13 These differences
have caused the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize that “the forces of arm’s-
length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same
manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.”14
In Part III we examine the economic consequences of the legal
environment. Previous research has shown that mutual fund advisory fees
FIN. ECON. 40 (2011) (concluding the mutual fund industry is competitive after finding that
incumbent funds that have high investment overlap with new entrants, subsequently engage
in price competition by reducing management fees); Martijn Cremers et al., Indexing and
Active Fund Management: International Evidence, 120 J. FIN. ECON. 539 (2016) (finding that
the availability of indexed funds is associated with improved competition).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b (2006).
11. Investment Company and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2012).
12. Investment managers who create and manage mutual funds are also referred to as
fund sponsors.
13. See Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 701, 713 (2017) (hereinafter “Regulatory Capture”) (describing how mutual
funds work).
14. Jones v. Harris, 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2009).
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are substantially higher than comparable institutional advisory and mutual
fund sub-advisory fees, both of which are heavily influenced by competitive
forces.15 This Paper finds similar results and concludes that the investing
public is overcharged by about $30 billion annually in excess advisory fees.
In addition, because fund sponsors charge above market advisory fee rates,
they earn economic profits for their owners. We determine that the universe
of publicly traded mutual fund sponsors has earned very high and statistically
significant excess returns for owners over long time periods.
Finally, in Part IV we present a summary and conclusions.
I. TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND ASSETS AND FEES
A. The Universe of Mutual Funds 2005 to 2015
The universe of domestic mutual funds includes all open-end, closed-
end, and exchange traded funds. In Table 1, we compare asset levels and
asset-weighted expense ratios for the ten-year period spanning 2005 to 2015,
using data from the Morningstar Direct database.
15. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of
Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 635 (2001) (hereinafter “Freeman-Brown”)
(comparing the advisory fees for mutual funds and public pension funds); see also H. Norman
Knickle, The Mutual Fund’s Section 15(c) Process: Jones v. Harris, the SEC and Fiduciary
Duties of Directors, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 265, 294-95 (2011) (sharing findings that
mutual fund fees are higher than fees charged by pension plans and other institutional clients).
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Line A of Table 1 reveals that mutual fund assets increased by 142%
between 2005 and 2015, from about $6.8 trillion to $16.4 trillion. Over the
same period, weighted average expense ratios fell from seventy-seven basis
points to fifty-five basis points, a decrease of twenty-two basis points and a
percentage decrease of 29%. There was a $9.6 trillion increase in mutual
fund assets caused by a combination of increased asset values of the
underlying securities and new funds flowing into mutual funds.
Line B shows that a substantial part (about $1.8 trillion) of the increase
in fund assets came from an explosion of Exchange Traded Fund (ETF)
assets that increased more than 600%, from about $300 billion to $2.1
trillion. At the same time, the number of ETFs offered in the market
increased by about 800% so that the average ETF decreased in size from
about $1.9 billion in assets to about $1.4 billion. Weighted average fees
(expense ratios) on ETFs decreased slightly from twenty-seven to twenty-
five basis points. In 2005, when the movement was in its infancy, the bulk
of ETFs were plain vanilla index funds such as the State Street S&P 500
ETF, which in 2005 had assets of $59 billion and an expense ratio of 10 basis
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points. By 2015, the fund had grown to $182 billion and the expense ratio
had fallen to nine basis points. Over the same time period, the Vanguard
Total Stock ETF grew from $5.6 to $57 billion and the expense ratio fell
from seven to five basis points.16
After 2005, the industry offered an array of increasingly complex ETFs
such as international, smart beta, leveraged and derivative based products.
These tend to have higher expense ratios. For instance, the most expensive
domestic ETF in 2015 was the Teucrium Corn fund with an expense ratio of
403 basis points and $61 million of assets under management. The fund did
not exist in 2005. Similarly, a Proshares VIX Short Term Futures ETF had
$633 million in assets and an expense ratio of 1.4. The fund allows investors
to speculate on market volatility. Hundreds of new ETFs were created to
mimic Chinese and other international equities.
Morningstar categorizes $2.14 of the $2.17 trillion of ETFs as of 2015
as “passive” or passively managed. However, this is somewhat misleading.
Although technically ETFs are passively managed, they constitute the
majority of trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange and thus a
principal use is in short term trading. Some investors clearly use ETFs for
long term passive investing but there is ambiguity as to what proportion of
ETFs are utilized in this fashion.
Line C of Table 1 shows that closed-end fund assets increased by about
39% from $151 billion to $209 billion. The average expense ratio increased
slightly, and the average closed-end fund decreased slightly in size because
the number of closed-end funds offered increased by about 40%.
Line D of Table 1 strips out ETFs and closed-end funds from the
universe of funds, leaving the universe of open-end funds, including money
market funds and actively and passively managed funds. The universe of
open-end funds grew from about $6.3 trillion in assets in 2005 to about $14.1
trillion in 2015, an increase of 122%. The asset-weighted Total Expense
Ratio fell by twenty basis points from 78 to fifty-eight basis points.
Much of the decrease in expense ratios for open-end funds occurred
because investors switched from actively to passively managed funds as
illustrated in Line E of Table 1. Open-end index fund assets increased from
about $545 billion to $2 trillion between 2005 and 2015, an increase of
268%, while the weighted average index fund expense ratio fell more than
50% from twenty-seven to thirteen basis points. Open-end index fund assets
increased from 8.6% to 14.3% of all open-end funds.
The dramatic decrease in interest rates between 2005 and 2015 also
contributed to the overall fall in expense ratios on open-end funds. Line F
shows that money fund assets more than doubled over the period while
16. Vanguard is a mutual fund organization and provides its funds at cost to investors.
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money fund expense ratios fell 66% from thirty-eight to thirteen basis points.
Given a near zero interest rate environment in 2015, money fund managers
were forced to dramatically increase fee waivers to avoid imposing a
negative rate of return on money funds.
Excluding index and money market funds from the universe of open-
end funds leaves the universe of actively managed, non-money market funds
in Line G of Table 1. Actively managed fund assets doubled from about $4.6
trillion to $9.5 trillion, but the share of actively managed funds fell from 73
to 68% of the total of all open-end funds. Weighted average expense ratios
fell from 95 to 80 basis points, a 16% decrease and about half of the overall
decrease in expense ratio of the universe.
In summary, from 2005 to 2015 mutual fund assets increased
dramatically with a disproportionate increase in ETFs and index funds.
There was a concomitant and expected decrease in overall expense ratios,
but smaller expense decreases on actively managed funds. We examine the
universe of actively managed funds in the next section.
B. Analysis of Fees on the Universe of Actively Managed Open-end
Funds
The Total Expense Ratio consists of the sum of three broad
components: administrative fees, distribution fees and management fees.
Administrative fees are the sum of fees paid to various service providers of
the fund including directors, the Transfer Agent (TA), the custodian and the
fund accountant. Distribution fees are fees, also known as 12b-1 fees, after
an SEC rule passed in 1980, charged against fund assets that cover fund
marketing costs.17 Management fees18 are percentage fees charged against
average assets and paid to the manager of the fund’s portfolio.
Panel A of Table 2 presents a breakdown of these three broad categories
for the universe of actively managed open-end funds for the 2005 to 2015
period. It reveals that the decrease in the weighted average total expense
ratio was the result of decreases in administrative and distribution fees.
Advisory fees, however, were flat over the period in spite of a doubling of
assets. We will consider this important finding after discussing
17. See Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, 45 Fed. Reg. 73, 898 (Nov.
7, 1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270.12b-1).
18. Management fees are sometimes called portfolio management fees or advisory fees.
Because the term “management fees” could be confused with administrative fees, in this Paper
we consistently label portfolio management fees as simply “advisory” fees.
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administrative and distribution fees.
Administrative Fees. The decrease in administrative fees is not
surprising. Administrative services are likely to be subject to economies of
scale and there is robust and transparent competition to provide most of
these services. The TA contract is the most consequential of the
administrative contracts. The TA is the entity that keeps the books on fund
shareholders. It tallies purchases and sales and distributes dividends and
reports, etc. The TA and various service/sales personnel who are
compensated via distribution fees are the interface with fund shareholders.
Collectively, they insulate the portfolio manager from all interactions with
shareholders. TAs are often subsidiaries of the large fund families. The
smaller fund sponsors contract with third party providers, often large banks
that also provide the bulk of custodial services for fund portfolios.
776 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. XX:IV
Distribution Fees. Distribution fees are an often-misunderstood
portion of expense ratios. As originally designed by the SEC, distribution
fees were marketing fees charged against the assets of existing customers to
attract new customers. Marketing fees are a normal expense of the
investment management company that sponsors the fund and would
typically be charged against the management company’s profits. However,
in what Brown has characterized as a regulatory capture “coup,”19 the
investment management industry convinced the SEC to allow fund
management to tap fund assets via SEC Rule 12b-1.
The industry initially argued that such fees would eventually lead to a
reduction in overall fees because of economies of scale in the advisory
function.20 The anticipated savings never materialized.21 Fund sponsors
continue to charge distribution fees, but the fees have been transformed
into uses not originally intended by the SEC, i.e., to support sales
commissions. As originally implemented, the rule allowed fund
management to tap assets up to twenty-five basis points per year.22 This
ceiling on what are currently referred to as “shareholder service” fees,
remains in effect today. Funds with such shareholder service fees may
characterize themselves as “no-load” funds.23
Distribution fees on funds that charge some form of sales load are
currently capped at 100 basis points. The incremental seventy-five basis
points support Contingent Deferred Sales Charges (CDSCs), a means of
paying sales loads over times by incremental increases in expense ratios via
12b-1 fees.24 CDSCs sometimes camouflage sales loads and some
investors are unaware that the fund salesperson is earning a commission.25
19. Regulatory Capture, supra note 13, at 716.
20. See John Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Fee Mess, 32 J. CORP. L. 739, 768
(2007) (explaining that these theorists believed that money could be taken from mutual fund
shareholders to pay for the marketing efforts in a way that would yield savings as the fund
grew).
21. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES
AND EXPENSES III (D) (2)(2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm; LORI
WALSH, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS TO FUND SHAREHOLDERS OF 12B-1 PLANS: AN
EXAMINATIONS OF FUND FLOWS, EXPENSES AND RETURNS (2004),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf.
22. See FINRA Rule 2341(d)(4) (“No member or person associated with a member shall,
either orally or in writing, describe an investment company as being “no load” or as having
“no sales charge” if the investment company has a front-end or deferred sales charge or whose
total charges against net assets to provide for sales related expenses and/or service fees exceed
.25 of 1% of average net assets per annum.”).
23. Fast Answers: Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmffeeshtm.html#distribution (last visited Oct. 16,
2017).
24. FINRA Rule 2341(d)(2).
25. John Freeman, supra note 20, at 761.
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Panel B of Table 2 shows that between 2005 and 2015 actively
managed assets carrying some form of distribution fees increased by about
46% from $2.6 to $3.8 trillion. The increase was at a lower rate than
overall active assets so that the proportion of actively managed assets
carrying distribution fees fell from about 56% to 40%.
Shareholder service fees increased 83%, from $3.1 billion to $5.6
billion. At the same time total CDSC fees fell 18% from $6.7 billion to
$5.5 billion as investors apparently wised up to the nature of the fees and
switched to ETFs, index funds or funds without sales commissions.
Overall, distribution fees increased about 13% from $9.8 billion to $11.1
billion.
Advisory Fees. Panel C of Table 2 reveals that during a period when
actively managed fund assets more than doubled, weighted average
advisory fees increased slightly and median advisory fees actually
increased from seventy-seven to eighty-four basis points. This occurred in
spite of a 57% increase in average fund size from $1.07 billion to $1.68
billion. There were 1,359 new actively managed funds, a 31% increase and
230 new fund sponsors, a 45% increase.
These results are inconsistent with competitive pricing of advisory
fees. The median fee increase indicates that new funds and entry of new
fund sponsors occurred at higher prices. New entry and competitive
pricing would normally result in lower overall prices. Similarly, a 57%
increase in average fund size combined with economies of scale should
have resulted in a decline in average advisory fee rates. At a minimum, the
decline should have mimicked the fall in administrative fees of about 28%.
The intuition is that the mutual fund advisory function should exhibit
scale economies. It should cost little more to manage a $10 billion than a
$1 billion portfolio. The industry itself argued that economies of scale
would reduce fees because of increased assets associated with the
imposition of distribution fees.26 Industry pioneer John Bogle has
commented that there are “staggering” economies of scale in the mutual
fund business.27 A study by McKinsey & Co. found economies of scale in
investment management, administration, marketing and operations in the
money management business.28 Specifically, investment management costs
fall from about thirteen basis points for firms with less than $25 billion
26. Id. at 768.
27. Mutual Fund Industry Practices and Their Effect on Individual Investors: Hearing
before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 73 (2003)
(testimony of John C. Bogle, President, Bogle Financial Markets Research Service and Found
and former Chief Executive, Vanguard Group).
28. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, THE ASSET MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY IN 2010 (2006).
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under management to about six basis points when assets exceed $100
billion.29
Brown’s hypothetical cost curve, grounded in empirically reasonable
parameters, shows that increased profit margins of fund to fund sponsors
are associated with increased economies of scale.30 As discussed below,
courts have allowed permissible profit margins as high as 77%.31 Industry
average profit margins in the range of 50 to 60% are common.32 Average
profit margins on large cap and money market (pre-crash) portfolios of
70% are also typical.33
Other researchers identify what they label as economies of scale.
However, the results are ambiguous. Latzko found that expense ratios
decrease as assets increase.34 Similarly, Investment Company Institute
employees have shown that operating expense ratios (advisory plus
administrative fees) decrease when assets increase.35 These results are
consistent with overall economies of scale but fail to differentiate between
advisory and administrative scale economies.
Comparative fees charged by the largest fund sponsors offer evidence
of economies of scale. There are currently more than 700 firms sponsoring
mutual funds. However, the bulk of fund assets are concentrated among a
few firms. Panel C of Table 2 shows that more than 50% of actively
managed mutual fund assets are concentrated in the ten largest mutual fund
sponsors or fund families. The twenty largest families manage 65% of
active fund assets.
Panel A of Table 3 shows detail of assets and asset-weighted expenses
of the ten largest mutual fund families that offer actively managed open-
end funds. Of special interest are the fees of the Vanguard family of funds
as compared to the other nine families. Vanguard is unique because it is a
29. Id. at 33.
30. Stewart Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity, 16
J. BUS. & SEC. L. 329 (2016) (hereinafter “Some Analytical Clarity”).
31. Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 962, 977, n.77
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
32. Meyrick Payne & Sara Yerkey, MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE CONSULTING,
INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY RETURNS AS AVERAGE ASSETS RISE IN 2010 (2010),
http://production.mfgovern.com/content/view/108/91/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
33. C. Meyrick Payne & Sara Yerkey, PROFITABILITY BENCHMARKS IN CONTRACT
RENEWAL – APRIL 2008 MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE CONSULTING,
http://production.mfgovern.com/content/view/71/91 (last accessed Aug. 30, 2017)
(hereinafter “Profitability Benchmarks”).
34. David A. Latzko, Economies of Scale in Mutual Fund Administration, 22 J. FIN. RES.
331, 336 (1999).
35. John D. Rea et al., Operating Expense Ratios, Assets, and Economies of Scale in
Equity Mutual Funds, INV. CO. INST. PERSPECTIVE, Dec. 1999, at 2,
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per05-05.pdf.
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mutual organization and provides its services at cost. Vanguard itself
conducts no active management. Rather, it hires sub-advisors to manage its
active portfolios. It is noteworthy that each of Vanguard’s subadvisors is a
for-profit firm and that sub-advisory fees are the result of arm’s-length
negotiation between Vanguard and the sub-advising firm.
Vanguard asset-weighted average advisory fees are 10.7 basis points,
less than a fourth of the weighted average of the other large fund families.
Moreover, Vanguard’s expense ratio is about a third of the weighted
average expense ratios of the other nine large fund families. Panel B of
Table 3 leads to similar conclusions for passively managed open-end funds.
Vanguard and Fidelity charge about eight basis points to manage their
various passive products, yet tens of billions of dollars are invested in fund
families with expense ratios seven times higher than the Vanguard and
Fidelity funds.
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In 2004, Elton, Gruber, and Busse looked at index fund expenses and
asked the question: “Are Investors Rational?” They concluded that in a
market in which arbitrage is not possible, dominated products can
prosper.36 Panel B of Table 3 reinforces their conclusions. It shows that
tens of billions of dollars are invested in index funds with expenses far
higher than essentially identical (except for fees) index funds.
The Elton, Gruber, and Busse results combined with the evidence on
fees presented above suggest that the question of investor rationality may
apply to all mutual fund investors, not just those who invest in index funds.
Consider Panel A of Table 3 where the average Vanguard Total Expense
Ratio is roughly one third of the average for the other top nine families yet
collectively the other nine have garnered seven times the level of Vanguard
actively managed assets. Contrary to surface intuition about mutual fund
markets, the collective evidence from Tables 1, 2 and 3 demonstrates that
mutual fund advisory fees are insulated from market forces.
A fundamental assumption of the model of perfect competition is that
market participants are rational and fully informed. There is strong
evidence that this is not the case for most mutual fund investors. For
instance, the lack of financial literacy on the part of the general public has
been well-documented.37 Survey research has shown a lack of basic
knowledge about funds owned by typical investors.38 Another study
similarly found that 84% of investors believe that higher expenses mean
better performance.39
Palmiter and Taha’s survey of the literature on the behavior of mutual
fund investors concluded that investors are generally uninformed and lack
36. Edwin J. Elton et al., Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN.
261, 285-86 (2004).
37. See Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: Do People Know the ABCs of
Finance?, 24 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 260 (2015) (discussing remedies to the lack of
financial literacy amongst the United States population); FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF
CONG., FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG RETAIL INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-3 (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part2.pdf (last visited
Oct. 17, 2017) (concluding that Americans lack financial literacy).
38. See Gordon J. Alexander et al., Mutual Fund Shareholders: Characteristics,
Investor Knowledge, and Sources of Information, 7 FIN. SERV. REV. 301 (1998) (using a
survey of 2,000 randomly selected mutual fund investors to conclude that financial literacy
among mutual fund investors needs to be improved); Noel Capon et al, An Individual Level
Analysis of the Mutual Fund Investment Decision, 10 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 59 (1996) (finding
that grouping investors with those who make similar investment decisions reveals that a small
group of highly-skilled investors exists, but that most investors are naïve and unskilled); Peter
J. Wallison & Robert E. Litan, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY TO ORGANIZE MUTUAL
FUNDS (2007) (stating that intermediary boards keep costs high for investors, whom largely
lack financial literacy).
39. Brad Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses on Mutual
Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2117-18 (2005).
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financial sophistication.40 They noted that the industry and the SEC are
generally much more sanguine about the ability of fund investors to
discipline fees.41 Brown argues that the investment management industry
has effectively captured the SEC and illustrates this with examples of the
Commission’s failure to force disclosure of important information.42
The tax code introduces frictions that make it difficult for many
investors to switch to low cost funds. A fund held for a long time is likely
to have achieved significant capital gains, the taxation of which would
swamp cost savings for many years.43 In addition, most 401K retirement
plans contain a limited menu of funds and many fail to include low cost
alternatives.44
Conflicts of interest impose significant costs on naïve and
inexperienced investors. Many stockbrokers, investment advisors and
financial planners are compensated by commissions on mutual funds,
providing an incentive to recommend funds with front loads or fund classes
with distribution fees.45
The evidence that active mutual fund management is unable to
consistently outperform passive management is well known,46 yet currently
more than nine trillion dollars is invested in actively managed mutual
funds.47 The overall decrease in mutual fund fees between 2005 and 2015
40. Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent Profiles,
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934, 936 (2008).
41. Id.
42. See Regulatory Capture, supra note 13, at 730-45 (explaining how the SEC
prioritizes non-disclosure of industry costs over investors’ interests).
43. To illustrate, assume that $10,000 is invested in a fund that experiences a 5% per
year capital appreciation. After ten years, the fund would be worth about $16,300 and if sold
would generate a capital gains tax of about $1,250 if the capital gains tax rate were twenty
percent. If the difference ($15,050) was reinvested in a fund with a twenty-five basis point
lower advisory fee, it would take more than thirty years for the value of the lower expensed
fund to equal that of the higher expense fund.
44. Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1481 (2015).
45. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, 102 (2017). As of the end
of 2016, about $1.9 trillion worth of asset funds carried a front load. Id. at 106, fig.5.13.
46. See Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual
Funds, 51 J. FIN. 783, 790 (1996) (considering why investors buy into actively managed
mutually funds even though they have lower returns compared with index funds); Michael
C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–1964, 23 J. FIN. 389, 415
(1968) (finding that actively managed mutual funds did not outperform funds with a buy-the-
market-and-hold policy); Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”:
Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497 (2008);
Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. Fin.
549, 571 (1995) (concluding that passive management funds have advantages over active
management funds, which generally fail to provide excess returns).
47. Supra Table 1.
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was caused largely by some investors switching to passively managed
funds, ETFs and index funds.48 There is little or no evidence that fees on
actively managed funds have been responsive to competitive pressures.49
Thus, the observation that dominated products can prosper in a market in
which arbitrage is not possible50 holds for actively managed funds as well
as index funds.
To summarize, in the 2005 to 2015 period, actively managed mutual
fund assets more than doubled. Yet, advisory fees were essentially flat.
This is both interesting and essentially inexplicable in economic terms.
The explanation lies in the legal and regulatory realm in which mutual fund
sponsors operate and it is to that realm we now turn.
II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY UNDERPINNINGS OF MUTUAL FUND
ADVISORY FEES
In the 1920s and 1930s, the mutual fund industry suffered from a
multitude of abuses including self-dealing, excessive fee levels, improperly
valued securities, and misleading advertising and accounting practices.51
The ICA dealt effectively with most of these problems. Congress included
in the ICA a provision directing the SEC to study the impact of investment
company growth and submit a report to Congress at a later date. In 1958,
the SEC commissioned the Wharton School of Finance to prepare a study
of the effects of the growth in the industry. The Wharton Study52 and a
subsequent SEC report53 included legislative recommendations.
The essential insight of the Wharton study and PPI report was that
advisory fees on mutual funds are too high because funds are captives of
the investment management firm and there is no effective competition for
managerial services.54 Investment management contracts cannot be
terminated except in extreme circumstances, and fund directors are
therefore limited in the scope of fee negotiations.55
48. See supra p. 9 (explaining that much of the decrease in open-end funds can be
attributed to investors switching from actively to passively managed funds).
49. Infra p. 24.
50. Elton, supra note 36.
51. Amy B. Lancellotta, Paulita A. Pike & Paul Schott Stevens, Fund Governance: A
Successful, Evolving Model, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 455, 458-89 (2016).
52. WHARTON SCH. OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP.
NO. 87-2274 (1962), http:// sechistorical.org/museum/papers/1960/ (hereinafter “Wharton
Study”).
53. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 (1966),
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/papers/1960/ (hereinafter “PPI Report”).
54. PPI Report at 64.
55. See Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument: The Limitations of the
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The Wharton study found that mutual fund advisory fees tended to
cluster around fifty basis points.56 More than 72% of advisers charged that
rate or more in 1960.57 The study found that mutual fund fees were
generally not responsive to asset levels.58 In a near majority of cases,
mutual fund advisory fees were two or more times as high as those imposed
on other clients.59 In about 15% of the cases, mutual funds were charged
more than five times the level of other advisory clients.60
The ICA mandates that 40% of a fund’s directors or trustees be
unaffiliated with the fund61 sponsor and that the unaffiliated directors
“negotiate” advisory fees with the fund sponsor.62 The study stated that
unaffiliated directors “may be of restricted value as an instrument for
providing effective representation of mutual fund shareholders in dealings
between the fund and its investment adviser.”63
The PPI report found similar results. In 1965, fifty-seven mutual
funds with assets of at least one hundred million dollars had a median
advisory fee of forty-eight basis points (a decrease from fifty to forty-eight
basis points caused by litigation settlements in lawsuits filed following the
release of the Wharton Study).64 The average (unweighted) advisory fee
was forty-five basis points.65
The study looked at the fee schedules of annual advisory fee rates to
manage a hundred-million-dollar portfolio published by six leading banks.
The annual fee for five of the six banks amounted to six basis points, a rate
less than one eighth of the fifty basis points commonly charged to mutual
funds of that size.66 The sixth bank charged seven basis points.67
Moreover, the study noted that banks absorbed some costs for marketing
and custodial services that were handled under separate contracts for
mutual funds.68
Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 273-74 (2013)
(explaining that terminating the investment advisor is complicated because the advisor’s role
constitutes the core of the company).
56. Wharton Study, supra note 52, at 490.
57. Id. at 482-83.
58. Id. at 484 and 490.
59. Id. at 489.
60. Id. at 489. In nine instances the fee rate charged open-end companies was five or
more times as high as that charged all other clients.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2012).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2012).
63. Wharton Study, supra note 52, at 34.
64. PPI Report, supra note 53, at 11.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 115.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 116.
784 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. XX:IV
Both the Wharton study and the PPI report found that advisory fees
were too high relative to fees negotiated at arm’s length. Both studies
identified a systemic problem and showed excessively high fee levels in the
industry as a whole. Both studies were also skeptical of the efficacy of
unaffiliated directors to negotiate advisory fees: “It has been the
Commission’s experience in the administration of the Act that in general
the unaffiliated directors have not been in a position to secure changes in
the level of advisory fees.”69
Following is a quote from the Letter of Transmittal from the SEC to
Congress:
The report concludes that mutual fund shareholders need
protection against incurring excessive costs in the acquisition and
management of their investments and that, given the structure and
incentives prevailing in the industry, neither competition nor the
few elementary safeguards against conflict of interest deemed
sufficient in 1940 and contained in the Investment Company Act
presently provide this protection in adequate measure. It is
recommended that the statute be amended to expressly require that
the compensation received by persons affiliated with investment
companies, including their management organizations, for
services furnished to an investment company be reasonable, and
that this standard be enforceable in the courts.70
Before the 1970 amendments, the leading case concerning the
excessiveness of advisory fees applicable to mutual funds, a decision of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, stated the rule as:
[W]hether what the corporation has received is so inadequate in
value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would
deem it worth what the corporation has paid. If it can be said that
ordinary businessmen might differ on the sufficiency of the terms,
then the court must validate the transaction.71
There was intense debate in Congress in the three years leading up to
passage of the 1970 amendments regarding the standard that should be
adopted for services furnished to an investment company to replace the
Saxe-Brady “corporate waste” standard. Bills introduced in the House in
196772 and the Senate in 196873 adopted the SEC’s “reasonableness”
standard. Industry opposition to the bills argued that allowing the courts to
69. Id. at 131.
70. Id. at viii.
71. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
72. See H.R. 9510, § 8(d), 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967) (setting forth factors to consider
in determining the reasonableness of the compensation)).
73. S. 3724, § 8.
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determine whether a management fee was reasonable would turn the ICA
into a ratemaking vehicle74 and allow the courts to substitute their own
business judgment for that of fund directors.75 The minority views in the
1968 Senate Committee Report echoed the industry’s opposition to what it
characterized as the ratemaking nature of the proposed amendments.76 The
1967 and 1968 legislation failed and with it the SEC’s proposed
reasonableness standard.
Between the end of the 1968 legislative session and additional
Congressional hearings in 1969, members of the House and Senate
committees drafting revised legislation met several times with officers of
the Investment Company Institute.77 As a result, the 1970 amendments to
the ICA removed the “reasonableness” standard opposed by the ICI, made
investment advisers “fiduciar[ies]” with respect to fees,78 and gave
investors a private cause of action.79 Although Congress left it to the courts
to determine an appropriate standard to gauge whether a particular fee
violated the investment adviser’s fiduciary duty,80 the Senate Report
provides the courts some guidance regarding the intent of the legislation:
In reporting this bill, your committee recognizes the importance of
permitting adequate compensation and incentives so that men of
ability and integrity will continue to be attracted to the mutual fund
industry . . . . [T]he forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work
74. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 14742 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
90th Cong. 382 (1967) (statement of Phil E. Pearce, Chairman, Board of Governors, National
Association of Securities Dealers). The reasonableness standard was endorsed by the
American Bankers Association, however; see Investment Company Amendments Act of
1968, S. Rep. 90-1351, at 2-3 (1968).
75. Lancellotta et al., supra note 51, at 467.
76. S. Rep. No. 90-1351, supra note 74, at 40.
77. Hearings on S. 34 and S. 296 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong. 8 (statement of Hugh F. Owens, Commissioner, SEC). See also Hearings on H.R.
11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737 Before the H. Comm. on Commerce and Fin. Of
the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. (1969) (statement of Hamer H.
Budge, Chairman, SEC) (“. . .Chairman Sparkman stated that this bill was worked out
between the industry and the Commission as well as with members of his committee.”)
78. See Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 35(b), 84
Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2012)) (explaining that
investment advisors are deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to compensation for
their services).
79. Id.
80. Tory L. Lucas, Judge Not Under an Unjust Standard: Why an Investment Adviser’s
Fiduciary Duty as to Fees under Section 36(B) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 is
Illusory and Unjust Until an Adjudicated Case Illustrates a Breach of the Fiduciary Duty, 9
LIBERTY U. L. REV. 469, 513 (2015); see Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694
F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982) (Congress made . . . “no attempt to set forth a definitive test by
which observance or breach of fiduciary duty was to be determined.”).
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in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in other
sectors of the American economy . . . . [Y]our committee has
decided that there is an adequate basis to delete the express
statutory requirement of ‘reasonableness,’ and to substitute a
different method of testing management compensation. This bill
states that the mutual fund investment advisor has a specific
‘fiduciary duty’ in respect to management fee compensation . . . .
Your committee recognizes the fact that the investment adviser is
entitled to make a profit . . . . [I]t is not intended to introduce
general concepts of rate regulation as applied to public utilities . . .
. This section is not intended to authorize a court to substitute its
business judgment for that of the mutual fund’s board of directors
in the area of management fees . . . . This provision does not
represent a finding by the committee as to the level of fees in the
industry. Your committee does not believe itself qualified to make
such judgments. Nor is it contemplated that the Commission will
seek a general reduction of fees on an industrywide basis.81
In the 1970 legislation, Congress totally repudiated the findings of
experts at the Wharton School of Finance and the SEC that management
fees were too high in the whole system and that fund directors were
ineffective in policing fees. The Committee did not feel qualified to make
judgments concerning the level of fees in the industry but did feel qualified
to direct the SEC not to seek a general reduction in fees. In addition, the
Committee directed the courts to give deference to mutual fund directors.82
The Wharton study and PPI report presented Congress with a visible
political problem: structurally, management fees are not subject to arm’s
length negotiations and are systemically higher than fees that are subject to
competition. Making advisers fiduciaries was the purported solution to the
problem. However, the Senate Report signaled a very different intent and
the judicial system got the message.
Courts enforce laws as written, taking into account the underpinning
legislative intent of Congress. In this case, the judicial system was given
clear marching orders: legislative intent was crystal clear – Congress was
endorsing the status-quo of high fees. The judicial system complied, and
case law precedents support the status quo that existed in 1966 and that
exists today.
81. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1969, S. Rep. 91-184, at 4-7 (1969).
82. Congress was more circumspect in the actual language of the statute. Section 35(b)
states that a reviewing court should take into account fund directors’ approval of an adviser’s
management contract by “giving such consideration . . . as is deemed appropriate under all
the circumstances.” 15 U.S.C. §80a-36(b)(2) (2012).
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The enacted legislation curtailed fund sponsor exposure to damages.
It provided only a one-year lookback damage period that effectively limited
monetary penalties and reduced any serious deterrent effect. This
reinforces the insight that the 1970 Amendment favored the investment
management industry at the expense of individual investors.
The results of fee litigation since the passage of the 1970 Amendment
support the proposition that the playing field is tilted towards the
investment management industry. Just as no plaintiff ever recovered under
the pre-1970 state common law “corporate waste” standard,83 no plaintiff
has ever received an award for excess fees under section 36(b).84 This
remains true in 2017. Yet advisory fees are essentially the same or higher
than they were in 1960 and 1965 when the Wharton School and the SEC
conducted their studies. Table 4 compares assets and average/median fees
in 1960, 1965, 2005, and 2015. In spite of vigorous growth in assets and
mutual funds offered, average and median fees increased from 1960-65 to
2005 and 2015. The evidence presented below shows that advisory fees
continue to far exceed fees subject to competitive forces.
The investment management industry and the judicial system faced
certain problems in maintaining the status quo. In spite of laws passed by
Congress, the laws of economics are stubborn things and remained in
83. See 114 CONG. REC. 23301 (July 25, 1968) (statement of Sen. Bennett) (“.[I]n every
case, the court has determined that on the basis of the information available, the fee was
reasonable or at least within the law.”). See also Hearings on S. 34 and S. 296 Before the S.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 20 (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General
Counsel, SEC) (“No shareholder has successfully recovered in suits on management fees”);
id. at 107 (colloquy between Sen. Proxmire and Robert L. Augenblick, President, ICI) (“Sen.
Proxmire: Can you give me an example of any instance at all in history in which a plaintiff
has ever won a suit to reduce management fees? Mr. Augenblick: So far as I know, there
have been three litigated cases, and in none of these cases was the plaintiff successful.”)
84. JAMES D. COX ET. AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed.
2008).
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effect. The principal problem was that fees actually determined by arm’s
length bargaining did not disappear. To avoid the inconvenient comparison
of fees over time, the investment management industry settled cases that
might result in bad precedent and allowed to be brought to trial only cases
that allowed the judiciary to find favorable outcomes.
A. The Judiciary Weighs In
We now turn to the important judicial decisions that facilitated
maintenance of the status quo.
1. The Business Judgment Rule – Burks v. Lasker
The Business Judgment Rule (business judgment rule) is a judicially
created doctrine in corporation law that requires courts to defer to the
business judgment of corporate executives. The basic notion is that
corporate boards are presumed to act in the best interests of shareholders
and that courts should not second guess directors. Directors are not liable
for errors in judgment if they act in good faith with due care. The genesis
of the business judgment rule for mutual funds are statements by the
President of the Investment Company Institute in the narrow context of the
SEC’s proposed reasonableness standard.85 The 1969 Senate Report
casually broadened the concept.86
In design and operation, mutual fund governance is much different
from normal corporate governance. Effectively, core business decisions
impacting the fund are made by the investment management firm
sponsoring the funds. Mutual fund boards are dominated by its officials
who have a clear conflict of interest because in effect they represent both
fund shareholders and the investment management firm. By limiting the
mandatory number of “independent” directors to 40% of the board,
Congress designed the ICA to preclude independent directors from having
veto power over core business decisions of the fund.
In Burks v. Lasker (Burks),87 fund shareholders brought suit against
the adviser and certain board members alleging lack of due care in the
85. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1969: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Banking and Currency on S. 34 and S. 296, 91st Cong. 107 (1969) (Statement of Robert L.
Augenblick, President and General Counsel, Investment Company Institute);
Mutual Fund Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong. 438 (1969) (Statement of Robert L. Augenblick, President and General
Counsel, Investment Company Institute).
86. Supra note 81, at 6.
87. (holding that a disinterested, fully informed director decision to terminate derivative
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purchase of Penn Central notes that subsequently defaulted. The court
noted that the ICA assigns to independent directors the role of “watchdog”
for fund shareholder interests.88 The independent directors approve the
annual investment management contract that determines fees paid by
shareholders and have other duties in areas in which the board can be
conflicted. In concluding that federal courts should apply state law
governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue such
derivative suits, the Supreme Court effectively enshrined the business
judgment rule, developed in the corporate law context, in mutual fund case
law.89 As a result of Burks, cases became harder for plaintiffs to win.
Burks and subsequent similar decisions are consistent with the overall
intent of Congress to maintain the status quo of mutual fund fees.
Langevoort argues, correctly, that Burks was pivotal in reducing the level
of judicial scrutiny in breach of fiduciary duty cases, although the unique
nature of mutual fund governance makes it a mistake to reason by analogy
to governance in other types of corporations.90
Debate in the literature concerning the efficacy of mutual fund
governance continues. Palmiter argues that fund independent directors,
[A]pprove fund transactions with the management firm and ensure
compliance with the 1940 Act and implementing SEC rules. Fund
directors thus function as outsourced regulators, with their
selection and compensation in the hands of the management firm
they supervise . . . . Fund boards have been weak and even
feckless protectors of fund investors . . . .91
According to the Investment Company Institute, however, mutual fund
governance could serve as a model for all of corporate America.92
Lancellotta, Pike & Stevens are also supportive.93
litigation should be upheld as an exercise of their business judgment).
88. Id. at 483.
89. See Id. at 487 (Stewart, J., concurring) (likening the decision of whether to sue an
alleged wrongdoer with any other corporate decision, decisions which are the purview of the
board).
90. Donald J. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty,
83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1017-19 (2015).
91. Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory
Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 165 (2006).
92. See Richard M. Phillips, Mutual Fund Independent Directors: A Model for
Corporate America, INV. CO. INST. PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 2003, at 2,
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per09-04.pdf (last accessed Aug. 30, 2017) (citing the Congressional
response to Enron-Worldcom as legislation emulating the corporate governance model for
investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940).
93. Amy B. Lancellotta et. al, Fund Governance: A Successful, Evolving Model, 10 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 455 (2016) (Paul Schott Stevens is President and CEO of the investment
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Others are largely skeptical of the efficacy of fund governance.94 One
study showed that the connections between directors and management
firms impact the decision to hire sub-advisers,95 while another found
evidence that higher paid independent fund directors approve higher
shareholder fees.96 In an exemplary review written subsequent to the
mutual fund scandals of 2003, Birdthistle found evidence of “camouflaged
extractions of shareholder value,” i.e., rents on the part of the investment
management industry. Among other things, fund governance failed to
detect or prevent large-scale market timing and late trading that cost fund
investors billions of dollars.97
The evidence seems to support the Palmiter position that fund boards
have been weak and feckless. As one lawyer who testified at the 1969
Senate hearings said, “[t]he testimony in our litigations shows the
unaffiliated directors passive to the point of somnolence, while the advisory
fees mounted year after year to figures of shocking magnitude.”98
Examination of Table 4 shows that independent fund directors remain
“somnolent.” Between 2005 and 2015, dollar advisory fees, the product of
percentage fees and fund assets, increased from about $24 billion to about
$50 billion. In a recent case, the judge chastised the independent directors
because although the directors were represented by counsel and were
provided with detailed materials to which they and the defendants can point
to and say, “see how thorough and careful we were,” the entire process
Company Institute).
94. See David J. Carter, Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action, 3 VILL. J.L. &
INV. MGMT. 6 (2002) (questioning the theoretical viability of fund governance due to a belief
that the interests of independent mutual fund directors may be closely aligned with those of
interested directors); Freeman-Brown, supra note 15 (arguing that interests of a fund’s board
are aligned with the investment adviser, rather than the shareholders); Lyman Johnson, A
Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at
Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497 (2008) (sharing inconclusive empirical evidence on the
relationship between mutual fund director independence and mutual fund advisory fees); Eric
D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that fundamental differences between mutual funds and
corporations necessitate a disentanglement of mutual fund governance from corporate
governance).
95. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in
the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2187 (2009) (hereinafter “Kuhnen”).
96. Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-setting in the U.S. Mutual
Fund Industry, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 321 (1997).
97. William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in
the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1451 (2006) (hereinafter “Birdthistle”).
98. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1969: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 179 (1969) (statement of Abraham L. Pomerantz, New
York Bar); see also Amy B. Lancellotta et al, Fund Governance: A Successful, Evolving
Model, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 455, 465 (2016) (citing to the Pomerantz quote).
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seems less a true negotiation and more an elaborate exercise in checking
off boxes and papering the file.99 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs lost the case.
2. The Fiduciary Standard – Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch
In the years after the 1970 amendments, the investment management
industry settled or otherwise disposed of six fee cases filed under section
36(b).100 Only following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burks in
1979, did the industry allow to be brought to trial a case that would
establish the fiduciary standard for what constitutes an excessive fee.101
The Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust (“the Trust”), a money market
fund, was ideally suited for industry purposes because of certain anomalous
features not common to funds in general. The Trust was unique in that the
fund was integrated into the Merrill Lynch brokerage operation in what
were known as Cash Management Accounts (CMAs). Such accounts
effectively circumvented banking laws that prevented banks from paying
interest on checking accounts.102 In the then paper-based financial world, a
stock transaction took several steps: a broker took a customer’s stock order
by phone, filled out a trade ticket, had the ticket entered into an electronic
system, and then wired the transaction to the trading floor for execution.103
Each stock transaction in a CMA generated an equal and opposite money
fund transaction: each stock trade ticket correspondingly credited or
debited (depending on the stock trade) the money fund. The brokerage
operation, under Merrill Lynch’s internal accounting procedures, received
processing costs from the money fund. Merrill Lynch conducted internal
time and motion studies to estimate the incremental expenses involved.104
Plaintiffs sought to compare the fund’s advisory fees with fees
actually determined by arm’s length bargaining, as had been done in the
Wharton study and PPI report. The industry successfully argued that
institutional accounts have lower management costs and thus higher fees on
mutual funds are justified.105 The appellate court disallowed the plaintiff’s
99. In re Am. Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 2009 WL 5215755 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
100. See Some Analytical Clarity, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 354-55 (
summarizing the six cases).
101. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 923 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that a fund manager’s fiduciary duty is assessed under a reasonableness standard).
102. See Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 30, at 356 (detailing the operation of the
Trust).
103. Id.
104. See Anita Ingrid Lotz, Deregulation or Regulation: Money Market Mutual Funds
and Other Illegitimate Offspring of the Banking and Securities Industry, 1 ANN. REV.
BANKING 187, 196 (1982) (detailing the operation of the CMAs); see also Gartenberg, 694
F.2d at 931 (referenced therein as the “Fitz-Gerald estimate”).
105. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930 (ruling that under section 36(b) of the Investment
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comparison of the Merrill Lynch advisory fees with fees charged to pension
funds because the “nature and extent of the services required by each type
of fund differ sharply. As the district court recognized, the pension fund
does not face the myriad of daily purchases and redemptions throughout
the nation which must be handled by the Fund . . . .”106
In all but a few unique funds in the 1970s and early 1980s, however,
managers of mutual fund portfolios were (and remain) insulated from all
contact with individual investors. Separate distribution and transfer agency
contracts cover interactions with investors,107 a deceptive industry strategy
only recently brought to light.108 The precedent of not allowing advisory
fee comparisons with pension and other institutional fees continues today,
despite the anomalous nature of the Merrill Lynch fund’s processing costs.
The Gartenberg court articulation of a fiduciary standard to gauge fee
excessiveness also remains in place: “To be guilty of a violation of §36(b),
therefore, the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length
bargaining.”109
The standard involves a two-pronged test: the fee at issue must be “so
disproportionately large” that it “could not have been the product of arm’s-
length bargaining.” As Lyman Johnson has observed, “the court illogically
framed the first prong in a way that deviates from ‘reasonableness’ and
seemed to require extremeness — ‘so disproportionately large,’ not just
‘disproportionately large,’ and ‘no reasonable relationship,’ not just
‘unreasonable’.”110
Contrary to Johnson, the court’s framing of the standard is not
illogical at all. The standard is extreme and entirely consistent with the
legislative intent of the 1970 amendments that were written to favor the
investment management industry at the expense of individual investors.111
Application of the standard is essentially determined by the subjective
judgment of the judiciary.
The appellate court also identified the elements, known as the
Gartenberg factors, that future courts should examine when applying the
standard. These included the profitability of the fund to the fund sponsor
Company Act, the correct standard to assess if a fund manager accomplished its fiduciary
duty is a reasonableness standard).
106. Id.
107. See Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 30, at 342 (detailing various contracts’
coverage of interactons with investors).
108. Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 30.
109. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
110. Johnson, supra note 46, at 516.
111. Supra note 81, at 4-7.
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and economies of scale. Different processing cost estimates confounded
the court’s ability to establish standards for these factors. Brown estimated
that the gross profit margin of the fund to Merrill Lynch, exclusive of
processing costs, was approximately 96%.112 Estimates of marginal
processing costs yielded a profit margin of about 70%,113 although other
estimates suggested that Merrill Lynch was losing money on the fund.114 It
was left to a subsequent court to establish a profit margin standard.
3. The Profit Margin Standard — Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime
Reserve Fund, Inc.
Unlike Gartenberg, the money market fund in Schuyt v. Rowe Price
Prime Reserve Fund, Inc. (Schuyt)115was not integrated into a brokerage
firm and had no processing costs. The fund had a TA to handle interactions
with investors.
The judge in Schuyt chose to ignore expert economic testimony
because the economic experts failed to analyze how the fund board
negotiated the advisory contract. He also denied any comparison of the
fund’s advisory fee with fees charged institutional customers. The judge
accepted the profit margin calculation of plaintiff’s expert: 59.1% in 1979,
66.8% in 1980 and 77.3% in 1981.116 The subjective nature of the
Gartenberg Standard was in full view in the decision:
While it cannot be denied that the Adviser earned a significant
profit from these services, it does not appear to the Court, in
light of all of the facts, that the fees charged by the Adviser
were so disproportionately large that they bore no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered and could not have been
the product of arms-length bargaining.117
112. Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 30, at 361.
113. Id. at 362.
114. Id. at 361.
115. See 663 F. Supp. 962, 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that T. Rowe Price did not
breach its fiduciary duty by charging excessive fees under section 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act).
116. Id. at 989.
117. The court, relying on the business judgment rule to justify its decision, hedged its
opinion somewhat in a footnote: “The Court wishes to make clear that it is not holding that a
profit margin of up to 77.3% can never be excessive. In fact, under other circumstances, such
a profit margin could very well be excessive. For example, if advisory services being
challenged were not of the highest quality and if the directors were not so obviously qualified,
fully informed, and conscientious, a similar fee structure could violate section 36(b).” Id. at
989 n. 77.
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The Schuyt court’s finding that a 77% profit margin was not excessive
continues to be used as a guideline by courts today. It represents a very
high hurdle for plaintiffs to prove a breach of fiduciary duty in mutual fund
fee cases. Profit margin data on individual funds are proprietary in nature
and seldom available outside of the litigation process where they are
subject to severe confidentiality agreements. However, summary numbers
are available from a Mutual Fund Governance consulting organization and
these numbers indicate that profit margins in the range of 50 to 60% are the
norm in the industry.118
4. The Vanguard Exception – Kalish v. Franklin Advisers
Kalish v. Franklin Advisers, Inc. (Kalish),119 decided subsequent to
Gartenberg and Schuyt, involved a GNMA fund, operated by Franklin
Advisors, a for-profit company. Franklin Advisors paid for advisory and
administrative services under a single unified contract that included
services for underwriting, TA, management and other items. The fund had
an expense ratio of .545%120 and an advisory fee over the period in question
of .45%.121
Plaintiffs in Kalish argued that the Franklin GNMA fund fees were
excessive relative to a comparable Vanguard GNMA fund.122 Defendants
contended that Vanguard comparison was inappropriate because the
Vanguard family of funds owned the management company, and thus
rendered services to the funds at cost, whereas Franklin Advisers sought to
make a profit.123
The administrative services provided to the Vanguard GNMA fund at
cost were of two types: advisory services and all other administrative
services. The advisory services were provided by a sub-advisory contract
with Wellington Management, a for-profit company, who managed the
portfolio for three basis points, while still making a profit. The entire
expense ratio of the Vanguard fund was thirty-five basis points.124 The
court’s analysis of the unified fee failed to analyze the advisory services
separately from the administrative services thereby corrupting the results.
Vanguard advisory fees are a good proxy for institutional fees because they
118. See Payne & Yerkey, supra note 32.
119. See 742 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that Franklin Advisers’ fees were
reasonable and not in violation of the Investment Company Act).
120. Id. at 1230.
121. Id. at 1240.
122. Id. at 1230.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1231.
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are competitively negotiated, but after Kalish, no subsequent case has
allowed the comparison.
B. Updating the Wharton Study and PPI Report
In the early 2000s, research by Freeman and Brown upset the status
quo.125 Their research updated the Wharton study and PPI report and found
that mutual fund advisory fees continue to exceed comparable institutional
fees,126 evidence that the 1970 Amendment to the ICA, which made
investment advisers fiduciaries with respect to fees, did not effectively deal
with the problem. The investment management industry sponsored
research promoting contrasting views concerning the competitive nature of
mutual fund “markets.”127 In reviewing the decision of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals that disapproved the Gartenberg approach, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P. (Jones)128 affirmed the
Gartenberg standard and stated that any review of a long-settled standard
such as Gartenberg “is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”129 In this
section, we examine the new evidence, the industry response, and the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Jones.
Freeman-Brown obtained fee information from large public pension
funds on equity portfolios managed by external investment advisory
firms.130 They analyzed 220 actively managed public pension portfolios
with about $100 billion in assets131 and compared these fees to similar
mutual funds. Table 5 presents the results. Weighted average pension fees
were twenty-eight basis points while mutual fund fees were fifty-six basis
points. Thus, the Wharton and PPI-documented differences between
mutual fund advisory fees and fees subject to arm’s length bargaining
continued for more than a quarter century after the Wharton study and PPI
report.
125. Freeman-Brown, supra note 15.
126. Id. at 672.
127. Infra at 136.
128. See 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010) (reaffirming Gartenberg formulation of Section 36(b)
of the Investment Company Act that imposes liability on investment adviser fees only when
they are so disproportionately large that they bear no reasonable relationship to the services
rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining).
129. Id. at 353.
130. Freeman-Brown, supra note 15, at 630.
131. Id.
796 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. XX:IV
SOURCE: John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609 (2001).
Weighted average management fees on actively managed public
pension portfolios were half the fees of comparable mutual funds, in spite
of the fact that the average mutual fund portfolio was three times the size of
the average institutional portfolio. The relative proportions of large, mid
and small cap portfolios were similar. The results are presented graphically
in Figure 1:
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In Figure 1, mutual fund advisory fee rates are relatively flat through
the first nine deciles and then dip substantially in the tenth decile
corresponding to an average fund size of about $10 billion. This is
consistent with large funds generating high margins because of economies
of scale, which force the manager to institute breakpoints in the contracts
so as not to exceed the Schuyt-allowed profit margin ceiling of 77%.
Pension fees decline relatively smoothly from the smallest to the largest
size deciles. This is consistent with competition forcing fees to decline as
asset levels increase. Thus, public sector institutions were able to take
advantage of economies of scale where fund investors were not.
The study breaks down fee differences for large, mid and small cap
portfolios. It finds the largest differences occur in the large cap sector
where weighted average mutual fund fees are fifty-two basis points and
pension fees are twenty-one basis points. This is consistent with the Payne
and Yerkey results that show average profit margins in the range of 50 to
60%, but higher (70%) profit margins on managing large cap portfolios.132
The study also looked at the advisory fees of the Vanguard Group where all
funds are sub-advised. It found that Vanguard fees were in line with
comparably sized pension fees.
C. The Industry Response
The Freeman-Brown study gained attention in 2003 when scandals of
the mutual fund industry came to light. In addition to targeting late trading
and market timing, New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer focused
attention on fee issues. The industry was forced to respond. The first
response came from the Investment Company Institute. Sean Collins, a
senior economist at ICI, based his arguments largely on misdirection. He
noted correctly that mutual funds and pension plans have very different
organizational structures and operations, serve different clientele and have
different business objectives.133 He then examined “operating expenses”
(management fees plus administrative fees) in detail. He found large
differences between mutual funds and pension funds.134 This is not
surprising and irrelevant to the fundamental issue of comparison of
advisory fees of the two types of organizations. Collins did make one
notable contribution to the argument. He found that sub-advisor fees on
132. Profitability Benchmarks, supra note 33.
133. Sean Collins, The Expenses of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Mutual Funds,
INV. CO. INST. PERSPECTIVE, Dec. 2003, at 1.
134. Id. at 8.
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mutual funds are essentially equivalent to pension advisory fees.135 This is
important and will be useful in Part IV of this Paper.
A second study by Coates and Hubbard was partially funded by the
Investment Company Institute.136 The principal finding of the paper is that
“price competition is in fact a strong force constraining fund advisers.”137
In reaching this conclusion, the paper conducts a detailed analysis of the
legal and economic literature and directly criticizes the Wharton study and
PPI report as well as the Freeman-Brown findings.138 The paper supports
its principal conclusions with a core proposition and a regression analysis
of fund fees that are demonstrably flawed.
One major problem with the Coates-Hubbard argument is the
evidence that many mutual fund investors are uninformed, unsophisticated,
and make poor investment decisions.139 In addition, frictions associated
with the tax code and retirement accounts constrain investors from
switching to low fee funds.140 Coates-Hubbard argued that given “a
sufficient number of buyers engaging in a price search for a given quality
of product and service, willing and able to switch to competitors,”
competitive prices would result.141
The problem with the Coates-Hubbard proposition is that with profit
margins perhaps as high as 77%, fund sponsors have no incentive to lower
fees for all customers in order to retain price sensitive customers. For
example, assume there is an actively managed large cap mutual fund with
$10 billion in assets and a fifty basis point advisory fee. The fund
sponsor’s profit margin is 70%, the typical large cap profit margin
according to Payne and Yerkey.142 Given these assumptions, the fund
generates $50 million in revenues (.005 times $10 billion) and operating
profits of $35 million (.70 times $50 million) for the fund sponsor.143
Assume the sponsor is confronted with competition from a low-cost
fund offering a twenty-five basis point advisory fee. The fund sponsor can
keep the whole $10 billion in assets but must lower fees across the board so
135. Id. at 2-3.
136. Asher Hawkins, Well-Funded Opinion, FORBES, May 25, 2009, at 28; John P.
Freeman, Stewart L. Brown, & Steven Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New
Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, at 107 (2007) (hereinafter
“Freeman-Brown-Pomerantz”).
137. John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry:
Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 153 (2007) (hereinafter “Coates-
Hubbard”).
138. Id.
139. Palmiter & Taha, supra note 40, at 936.
140. Ayres & Curtis, supra note 44, at 148-83
141. Coates-Hubbard, supra note 137, at 199.
142. Profitability Benchmarks, supra note 33.
143. Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 30, at 385.
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that revenues fall to $25 million and profits fall to $10 million.144 Or, the
fund sponsor can let the funds run off and maintain revenues of fifty basis
points on the remaining funds. Assume the competition causes $1 billion
to exit the fund. By refusing to lower fees across the board, the sponsor
continues to earn operating profits of about 70% of $45 million or $30
million.145 The sponsor’s choice is to earn $10 million and retain the fee
sensitive assets, or $30 million, and let the fee sensitive assets leave.146 It is
not a difficult choice.147 Investment advisors with high profit margins will
rationally choose to maintain high levels of fees and profits and let fee-
sensitive assets exit the fund.148 This reasoning is entirely consistent with
the evidence presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 of this Paper. The investment
management industry has chosen to maintain active management fees in
the face of competition from index funds and has allowed billions of
dollars to switch to index funds rather than compete on fees.
The overall Coates-Hubbard conclusions are based heavily on an
empirical analysis of fees that is disingenuous and deeply flawed. The
Wharton study, PPI report, and 1970 ICA amendments focused on advisory
fees independent of administrative fees. Distribution (12b-1) fees did not
exist at the time of the legislation. Yet the Coates-Hubbard empirical
results that they claim are “direct evidence that mutual fund investors are
sensitive to fees,”149 are based on cross-sectional regressions of asset levels
on Total Expense Ratios, not advisory fees. This is misleading. Table 2
shows that it is possible for overall fees to decline while advisory fees
remain constant. Thus, the Coates-Hubbard regression says nothing about
investor sensitivity to advisory fees. The results in Table 2 show that in the
face of a doubling of assets between 2005 and 2015, advisory fees actually
increased. Coates-Hubbard would struggle to explain that result.
Finally, the Coates-Hubbard assertions violate a basic tenet of
economics: in competitive markets price is equal to marginal cost. There
is direct evidence that this is not the case for mutual funds. A reasonable
approximation of the marginal cost of active portfolio management is the
market price of sub-advisory contracts, which include normal profit to the
firms providing the services. The Vanguard Group obtains sub-advisory
144. A 70% profit margin at fifty basis points on $10 billion means that costs would be
30% of $50 million or $15 million. If it is assumed that all of these costs are fixed, then the
dollar profit would be revenue of $25 million less costs of $15 million or $10 million.
145. Using the same logic, if all costs are fixed, then the $45 million in revenue, less $15
million in costs, yields $30 million in profit. In all likelihood, costs are not precisely constant,
but the main point of the illustration is clear.
146. Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 30, at 386.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Coates-Hubbard, supra note 137, at 215.
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services at roughly one fourth of the average advisory fees charged by the
other nine large fund families in Panel A of Table 3. It is interesting that
the average profit margin (Revenue – Cost)/Revenue of the other nine fund
families in Panel A of Table 3 is 76% under the assumption that the true
cost of investment management services is the average cost of the
Vanguard funds. It is no accident that this is close to the Fiduciary
Standard Maximum profit margin codified in the Schuyt case. The
advisory function is subject to economies of scale and the nine largest fund
families operate relatively very large mutual funds. It is to be expected that
large funds generate high profit margins.
D. The U.S. Supreme Court Weighs in: Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P.
In Jones,150 an excessive fee case filed under ICA § 36(b), Harris
Associates charged the Oakmark Fund greater advisory fees than it charged
institutional clients for similar services. The District Court ignored the
institutional fee comparison and gave great weight to the comparison of the
Oakmark Fund advisory fees to advisory fees charged by similar mutual
funds and granted summary judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs
appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The three-judge panel, in a ruling by
Judge Easterbrook, cited Coates-Hubbard and argued that the Gartenberg
standard was obsolete because competition imposed discipline on advisory
fees. The full court denied rehearing, but five judges, led by Judge Posner,
dissented, citing Freeman-Brown,151 Birdthistle,152 and a working paper by
Kuhnen153 finding that cronyism between agents in the mutual fund
industry led to increased fees that were borne by shareholders.154 The
Supreme Court accepted the case for review to resolve a split among the
Circuit Courts of Appeal as to the proper standard under §36(b) for
determining if a breach of fiduciary duty had occurred and unanimously
reaffirmed Gartenberg, despite its lack of “sharp analytical clarity.” The
court concluded that Gartenberg accurately reflected “the compromise that
is embodied in §36(b),” and that it had provided “a workable standard for
nearly three decades. The debate . . . regarding today’s mutual fund market
is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”155
The “workable standard for nearly three decades” is highly favorable
to the investment management industry and punitive to investors, but the
court was surely aware of that and that the standard is consistent with
150. 559 U.S. 335, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
151. Freeman-Brown, supra note 15.
152. Birdthistle, supra note 97.
153. Kuhnen, supra note 95.
154. Jones, 559 U.S. at 335.
155. Id. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Congressional intent as stated in the Senate Report. The court made
perfectly clear that changes in the status quo depended on “Congress, not
the courts.”
It follows that the essentially flat advisory fees from 2005 to 2015,
and indeed from 1960 to 2015, are an artifact of the unique corporate
structure of mutual funds. The investment management industry has
successfully manipulated the political and judicial system to insulate itself
from competitive pressures and maintain above market advisory fee rates.
The economic impact is examined in Part IV. First, we examine recent
court cases involving sub-advisory fees in which the industry has so far
prevailed.
E. Sub-Advisory Fee Cases
A substantial number of mutual funds (and variable annuities) are sub-
advised by money managers unaffiliated with the fund sponsor. Sub-
advisory fee rates are typically a fraction of the rates charged to the funds’
investors. Fund sponsors justify the mark-up as compensation for
“monitoring costs.” Plaintiffs charge that fees are excessive since sub-
advisory fees are determined by arm’s length bargaining and “monitoring
costs” are minimal.
Currently, several sub-advisory cases are working their way through
the judicial system. Preliminary results are unpromising for plaintiffs.
After a trial, one district court in New Jersey found for the defendants and
dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit.156 Similarly, in Kasilag v. Hartford
Investment Financial Services, LLC (Kasilag), the same district court (but a
different judge) granted defendants motion to dismiss, finding that
plaintiffs had “elected to present minimal evidence with regard to
comparative fee structures, fall out benefits, or economies of scale.”157 One
promising aspect of Kasilag is that the court gave some “limited weight” to
the Vanguard comparison because the fund in question used the same sub-
advisor as a similar Vanguard fund.158 Both cases are on appeal and there
are several other similar cases in various stages, none of which have yet
been dismissed.
One common element of these cases is that the courts place great
reliance on fund independent directors and the business judgment rule.
Recall that the ICA put independent directors in the role of “watchdogs”
for fund investors’ interests, especially as regards to fees. A casual perusal
of the Fund Director’s Guidebook reveals no material on the exercise of
156. Sivolella v. AXA, 2016 WL 4487857 (D.N.J. 2016).
157. No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017), at *71 (D.N.J. 2017).
158. Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Serv., LLC, 2012 WL 6568409, at *4-5 (D.N.J. 2012).
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business judgment on overall fund policy but detailed coverage of
responsibilities regarding advisory fees. Fund directors are made aware of
the legal implications of their roles and the comparison of advisory fees to
fees determined by arm’s length bargaining.
It would seem as though independent directors chosen for their
business acumen would recognize that the sub-advisory fees they approve
are negotiated at arm’s length. It should follow that truly independent
directors would rebel at the fund sponsor marking up such fees by 100 to
200% in the form of advisory fees. Directors focused on fund investor
interests would not allow that to happen. Yet, there is no indication that
this has ever occurred.
So, in addition to somnolence and the Palmiter assertion that fund
directors are “feckless” and “weak,”159 we can add the adjectives
incompetent and toothless. Moreover, these observations call into question
the business judgment rule itself. Independent directors have demonstrably
failed in their role as watchdogs. Further, by continuing to rely on the
business judgment rule, the judicial system avoids confronting the
inconvenient fact that advisory fees on sub-advised funds are much higher
than fees subject to the forces of arm’s length bargaining.
III. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXCESSIVE ADVISORY
FEES
The investment management industry has been extraordinarily
successful in manipulating the political and judicial systems to maintain
high investment advisory fees. This has resulted in excess payments of
billions of dollars annually by investors and has resulted, moreover, in
excess returns to the owners of investment management firms.
In this Section, we estimate annual excess fees paid relative to fees
that would be generated in a competitive market. Finally, we estimate the
excess returns that have accrued to the owners of the universe of publicly
traded investment advisory firms specializing in mutual funds and test
these returns for statistical significance.
A. Estimating Annual Excess Advisory Fees
1. Estimates Using the Freeman-Brown Results
Freeman and Brown compared advisory fees charged public pension
funds to mutual fund advisory fees and found that the latter were twenty-
159. Palmiter, supra note 91, at 165.
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eight basis points higher.160 This difference, when applied to the current
level of mutual fund assets, provides an estimate of the annual
overcharging of mutual fund clients relative to fees determined by arm’s
length bargaining. The data are somewhat stale but provide a reasonable
approximation of excess fees.
In 2015, total actively managed open-end mutual fund assets,
exclusive of money market funds, were $9.5 trillion. The product of $9.5
trillion times twenty-eight basis points yields a first approximation of
annual overcharging of about $26.6 billion. This estimate is understated
because of the size differential between the pension and mutual fund
portfolios. Pension fees would be lower on larger portfolios.
Freeman and Brown provide a means to estimate pension fees on
larger portfolios. They present the results of a regression of pension fees
on the log of pension assets.161 Applying the results of that regression to
the log of the average mutual fund portfolio asset level in their paper yields
an estimate of 21.1 basis points. The difference between 21.1 basis points
and the average mutual fund advisory fee of fifty-six basis points yields an
estimate of overcharging of 34.9 basis points. Applying 34.9 basis points
to the 2015 level of actively managed mutual fund assets suggests an
annual overcharging of about $33.2 billion.
This number could be too high. Freeman and Brown only looked at
equity portfolios162 and it is generally known that fees are lower on fixed
income funds. However, there is evidence that profit margins on fixed
income portfolios for fund sponsors are comparable to equity portfolios.
For instance, in periods of normal interest rates, the margins on money
funds are comparable to large cap portfolios and high yield bond portfolios
have profit margins similar to mid and small cap portfolios.163
Mutual fund and pension advisory fees are not strictly comparable
because there are some small cost differences. The Wharton study and PPI
report both reported that it was more expensive to manage pension
portfolios because custodial and marketing fees are typically covered by
pension fees but covered under separate contracts for mutual funds.
However, there are certain costs that must be covered when managing
mutual fund portfolios that are not present when managing institutional
portfolios. These include director’s fees and, because mutual funds are
marked to market daily, fund accounting costs. Using Lipper Analytical
data, Freeman, Brown and Pomerantz estimate that it costs not more than
160. Freeman-Brown, supra note 15, at 631.
161. Id. at 635.
162. Id. at 639.
163. Profitability Benchmarks, supra note 33.
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about three basis points more to manage mutual funds164 and these
estimates ignore the marketing and custodial costs suggested by the
Wharton study and PPI Report. In all likelihood, the cost differences are a
wash.
Coates-Hubbard also argued that it is more expensive to manage
mutual fund portfolios because large and frequent inflows and redemptions
occur for mutual funds that do not happen with pension portfolios.165
However, mutual fund portfolio managers hold cash positions to act as
shock absorbers, and fund investors, not the fund manager, absorb these
and the trading costs associated with inflows and redemptions. At any rate,
managing cash flows is a normal function of portfolio management in
pension as well as mutual fund portfolios. Moreover, these differences are
not present for sub-advised portfolios that yield similar estimates and are
examined in the next sections.
2. Vanguard Fees
All of the Vanguard Group’s actively managed mutual funds are sub-
advised, and the fees are aggressively negotiated at arm’s length.
Moreover, the investment management firms that manage these portfolios
earn normal profits or they would not agree to provide the services.
Vanguard is a mutual organization and provides its services at cost, so it is
valid to compare the weighted average advisory fees charged by the
Vanguard Group to fees charged to mutual funds in general and to use
these differences to estimate the annual amount that mutual funds clients
are overcharged for advisory fees.
Numbers in Panel A of Table 3 allow for the calculation of annual
excess advisory fees using the weighted average Vanguard advisory fee as
a proxy for the advisory fees determined by arm’s length bargaining. The
weighted average annual advisory fee for the ten largest mutual fund
families was forty basis points including the 10.7 basis points Vanguard
advisory fees. Excluding Vanguard assets from the calculation yields a
weighted average annual advisory fee for the remaining nine large fund
families of forty-five basis points. It follows that on average the top nine
fund families are overcharging their clients about 34.3 basis points (45
minus 10.7) on an annual basis. Applying the 34.3 basis point estimate to
the total of non-Vanguard actively managed open-end fund assets of $8.86
trillion yields an estimate of $30.4 billion annually.166 This is not
164. Freeman-Brown-Pomerantz, supra note 136, at 109 n. 90 (2007).
165. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 137, at 185 (2007).
166. This is likely to be a very conservative number. From Table 2, total active assets are
$9.5 trillion with a weighted average advisory fee of 53.2 basis points. The weighted average
advisory fee of the top ten fund families in Panel A of Table 3 is 40.1 basis points, which
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materially different from the $33.2 billion estimate using the Freeman-
Brown numbers. The Vanguard numbers are immune from the criticisms
of Freeman-Brown because sub-advised portfolios are subject to the same
cash management constraints and costs as portfolios that are not sub-
advised.
The $30.4 billion estimate of annual overcharging ignores possible
overcharging on money fund and indexed portfolios and thus is likely
conservative. On the other hand, the estimate could be somewhat high
because the Vanguard funds are much larger than normal and thus the sub-
advisory fees would be lower than average fees because of economies of
scale and aggressive breakpoints negotiated by Vanguard.
Next, we estimate annual overcharging using the universe of sub-
advised mutual funds excluding Vanguard. This allows for a more granular
and accurate procedure to estimate the annual overcharging of advisory
fees.
implies that the weighted average fees on the $4.9 trillion of assets outside the top ten families
was approximately sixty-five basis points and the difference between sixty-five basis points
and the Vanguard average 10.7 basis points is 54.3 basis points. Multiplying 54.3 basis points
times the $4.9 trillion of assets outside the top ten families is about $26.4 billion.
Overcharging on the nine largest fund families would be about $13.8 billion (34.3 basis points
times $4 trillion) and yields an estimate of total annual overcharging of about $40 billion.
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3. Non-Vanguard Sub-Advised Funds
A significant proportion of actively managed mutual fund assets are
sub-advised. Details are provided in Panel A of Table 6. Of the $9.5
trillion of actively managed funds at the end of 2015, 15.5% were sub-
advised: $671 billion in Vanguard funds and $799 billion in other fund
families.167 On average, the sub-advised funds were smaller than the non-
sub-advised funds, $850 million versus $1.72 billion, and advisory fees
were larger, 63.4 basis points versus 53.8 basis points.
167. There are also about $1.3 trillion in assets in “Funds of Funds” that are technically
sub-advised and that we ignore in our analysis because the reporting is not standardized. In
most cases, though, the assets in these funds are reflected in the assets held by the underlying
funds themselves, and the fees charged are attributed at that level as well. In some cases, the
fund of funds charges an overlay fee of some nominal value. This fee is not studied as part
of this analysis.
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The weighted average sub-advisory fees on the non-Vanguard sub-
advised funds was calculated at 26.2 basis points. This is a reasonable
estimate of market determined/arm’s length negotiated fees on funds with
an average size of about $850 million. In turn, these fees can be compared
to actual advisory fees to estimate the level of excess fees paid annually by
mutual fund investors. These calculations are shown in Panel B of Table 6.
Excess fees are the sum of excess fees on $8.04 trillion of non-sub-
advised and $799 billion of sub-advised funds. The difference between the
average advisory fee on the $8 trillion of non-sub-advised assets and 26.2
basis points is 27.6 basis points. This excess applied to the $8 trillion of
assets yields annual excess fees of $22.3 million. This is a conservative
estimate because the average non-sub-advised fund has twice the level of
assets of the sub-advised fund. The difference between the weighted
average advisory fees on the sub-advised funds (63.4 basis points) and the
weighted average sub-advisory fees of 26.2 basis points is 37.2 basis
points. This is an estimate of the percentage overcharging on sub-advised
funds. Applying this number to the $799 billion of sub-advised assets
yields an annual overcharging of $2.9 million. Thus, total excess fees are
estimated to be about $25.2 million. This number likely underestimates the
true number because the average sub-advisory fee was estimated using
funds with average assets of about $850 million. However, the average
non-sub-advised fund had about $1.72 billion in assets (from Panel A).
We adjusted our estimate of excess fees in Panel B by estimating the
average sub-advisory fee to be paid if the average fund’s size were $1.75
billion. We regressed the log of sub-advisory fees on the log of sub-
advised assets and extrapolated the results. Using this procedure, we
estimated that the average sub-advisory fee on a $1.75 billion portfolio
would be 20.4 basis points.
We present the results of this analysis in Panel C of Table 6. The
difference between 20.4 and 53.8 basis points is 33.4 basis points, which is
an estimate of the average overcharging on $8 trillion of non-sub-advised
funds with an average size of $1.75 billion. Using this difference yields an
estimate of overcharging of about $27 million on non-sub-advised funds
and a total of about $29.9 million annually.
Using various procedures, we have estimated that mutual fund
investors are overcharged between about $25 and $33 million per year.
These estimates are conservative because they ignore overcharging on
money and index funds. We conclude that a rough estimate of
overcharging is about $30 million per year.
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B. Excess Returns to Fund Sponsors
Economic theory suggests that in competitive markets long run prices
will tend to equal marginal costs and producers will earn normal profits and
normal rates of return for owners. Absent significant competitive forces,
producers can maintain prices above marginal costs and earn economic
profits and excess returns for owners. In this paper, we show prices well
above marginal costs in the mutual fund industry. Over long periods,
advisory fees are consistently above fees known to be determined by arm’s
length bargaining. Moreover, these excess fees are the result of the
influence of the investment management industry on the
political/judicial/regulatory system. If this view is correct and fund
sponsors do indeed charge excess fees, then the results should show up in
the forms of excess returns to the shareholders of the investment
management firms that sponsor and operate mutual funds.
Most investment management firms are either privately held (Fidelity,
American Funds) or subsidiaries of large banks or insurance companies
(Pimco, JP Morgan). Here, we identify the universe of publicly traded
investment management firms whose principal line of business is
sponsoring and managing mutual funds. Fund sponsors currently trading168
are identified by matching firms in the SNL Financial Index of Money
Managers with the Morningstar Direct database. These are listed in Panel
A of Table 7. This list is subject to survivorship bias. Over the years,
many fund sponsors have been absorbed into larger institutions. We have
made a good faith effort to identify these firms by examining the
composition of SIC Code 6282 (Investment Advice) over time. These
firms are listed in Panel B of Table 7.
168. Data is as of December 31, 2016.
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We examine the thirty-seven-year period from 1980 to 2016. The
beginning of this period corresponds roughly to the period when courts
began to apply the business judgment rule and Gartenberg standard. The
Center for Research on Security Prices database of monthly returns is the
principal source of data for Table 7. We use Morningstar Direct to show
Active Assets under management for currently traded firms.
Panel A identifies seventeen currently traded fund sponsors and Panel
B lists ten fund sponsors that traded in the past. All of these firms were
absorbed into larger firms.
The first two numerical columns of Panel A show Active Assets under
management and market share of the currently traded firms as of December
2015. Collectively, these firms manage about $1.6 trillion in active assets
and about 17% of total active assets.
The third numerical column of Table 7 shows the market
capitalization of the fund sponsors. It is presented as of December 2016 for
currently traded firms and as of the last month the firm appears in the
CRSP database for Panel B firms. In general, the fund sponsors are small
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capitalization stocks. Average market cap in Panel A is $7.8 billion and
$974 million in Panel B. Overall average market cap is $5.3 billion.
However, three currently traded firms qualify as large capitalization stocks:
Blackrock, Franklin Resources, and T. Rowe Price.
The remaining columns of Table 7 detail the annualized returns of
fund sponsors and the S&P 500 index returns over corresponding periods.
We estimate annual risk adjusted returns for each company by subtracting
the product of its market model beta and the returns on the S&P 500 from
sponsor returns over the corresponding period. The average market model
beta coefficient was 1.34, an indication that returns of these firms are
highly sensitive returns to the market. Overall, average risk adjusted
returns were 3.9% annually.
There are indications that scale economies impact excess returns.
Ranking the seventeen firms in Panel A by assets under management as of
the end of 2015 and splitting the sample reveals that the average risk
adjusted excess returns on the eight largest market share firms was 4.8%
and -0.4% of the nine smallest firms. Similarly, risk adjusted returns are
associated with market capitalization. Ranking all twenty-seven firms by
market cap reveals that the thirteen largest firms earned 9.1% risk adjusted
returns, while the fourteen smallest firms earned a risk adjusted -0.9%. The
overall insight from Table 7 is that, consistent with the economic profit
hypothesis, the universe of publicly traded mutual fund sponsors earns high
risk adjusted rates of return for their owners over long time periods.
To test for statistical significance, we construct a capitalization
weighted index of total returns for the thirty-seven year period from 1980
to 2016. The monthly returns for each of the firms in Table 7 are included
in the index for the times they were traded, and the returns included in the
CRSP database. Numerical results of this analysis are presented in Table 8
and graphical results in Figure 2.
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From Panel A of Table 8: overall, the compound average annual
return to the owners of the firms sponsoring mutual funds was 18.7%
versus 8.5% on the S&P 500. An investment of $1 in the S&P 500 in 1980
would have grown to $20.74 by 2016 while an investment in the cap
weighted index of fund sponsors would have grown to $563.59. The index
of fund sponsor returns was more volatile than the S&P 500. The annual
standard deviation of return on the cap weighed index was 26.4% versus
15% for the S&P 500.169
Results are presented graphically in Figure 2, which plots the indexes
on a log scale. The top line is the investment value of $1 from 1980 in the
Cap Weighted Index and the bottom dashed line is the S&P 500 index. The
middle-dashed line is the growth of the cap weighed index relative to the
S&P 500. An increase in the dashed line represents periods of out-
performance and declining sections represent periods of underperformance.
The outperformance of the cap weighted index is relatively consistent
throughout the thirty-seven year period but appears to diminish somewhat
in later periods. Relative performance is flat around the 1987 and 2008
market crash periods and it appears as though the fund sponsor index has
not outperformed since that period.
In Panel B of Table 8 we show the results of a test of the statistical
significance of excess returns of the fund sponsor index. We use the single
factor CAPM as the asset pricing model. The capitalization weighted index
of fund sponsors exhibits statistically significant excess returns at the 0.01
level. The alpha is 0.8% per month, an indication of annualized excess
returns of about 9.5%.
169. This is not an especially high level of volatility for a sector specific index. For
instance, the annualized standard deviation of the XLF financial sector spider from inception
in 1999 forward was an identical 26.3 percent.
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The statistical tests confirm the intuition of Table 7. Investment
management firms that sponsor mutual funds have earned very high risk
adjusted returns for their owners over long time periods. The most
probable cause of these excess returns is the captive nature of mutual funds
vis-à-vis the investment management firms that sponsor and operate them
and the resultant lack of arm’s length bargaining of advisory fees.
Finally, on a lighter note, Paul Samuelson, a Nobel Laureate, offered
some useful insights in testimony before Congress in 1967:
I decided that there was only one place to make money in the
mutual fund business – as there is only one place for a temperate
man to be in a saloon, behind the bar and not in front of the bar.
And I invested in . . . [a] management company.”170
Samuelson was way ahead of his time.
CONCLUSION
Mutual funds are unique corporate organizations. They have no
employees or physical assets. Essentially, a mutual fund is a collection of
contracts with various service providers. The principal service provider is
the investment management firm that creates, brands and manages the
fund. Sitting atop the fund is a part time board constrained in its ability to
act on behalf of fund shareholders. Essentially, fund sponsors are in a
monopoly position vis- à-vis the funds they operate.
Mutual fund “markets” seem to correspond closely to the model of
perfect competition. The evidence on fund fees presented here is thus
counterintuitive. However, the evidence is also compelling. The
investment management industry has successfully manipulated the
political, regulatory, judicial system and has maintained advisory fees
above market rates for more than fifty years.
This Paper consists of two intertwined analyses: financial and legal.
Financially, fund advisory fees have been essentially constant since at least
the 1960s in spite of high growth rates in mutual fund assets. Advisory
fees currently exceed fees established by arm’s length negotiation by about
$30 billion annually. The universe of publicly traded mutual fund sponsors
has earned statistically significant excess returns for shareholders over a
thirty-seven year period.
Legally, the Wharton study and PPI report identified the fundamental
conflict of interest that fund sponsors have been able to exploit vis-à-vis the
funds managed. Both the study and report showed significant differences
between fund advisory fees and fees determined by arm’s length bargaining
170. Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 358 (1967) (statement of Paul Samuelson).
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and led to the 1970 ICA amendments that made fund sponsors fiduciaries
with respect to fund fees. This proposed “solution” had a certain face
validity. However, the Senate Report signaled the clear intent of Congress
to maintain the status quo where fund fees are concerned.
The judicial system dutifully established legal precedent consistent
with the legislative intent of Congress, aided in this endeavor by the
investment management industry, which astutely chose to settle cases in
which the outcome might be an unfavorable precedent. In Burks, the courts
determined that the business judgment rule was applicable to mutual fund
governance even though all important business decisions impacting the
fund are made by the fund sponsor.171 In Gartenberg, the industry brought
to trial a fund with anomalous processing costs that enabled the courts to
disallow fee comparisons with fees determined at arm’s length.172
Gartenberg also put in place a highly subjective and restrictive fiduciary
standard for plaintiffs in fee cases to overcome. The business judgment
rule and subjective fiduciary standard were on full display in Schuyt where
the court determined that a 77% profit margin was not excessive.173 In
Kalish, the fund at issue conflated advisory and administrative fees and set
the precedent of disallowing comparison of fees on Vanguard Funds where
all funds are sub-advised.174
It would be simplistic to fault the judicial system for treating mutual
fund investors unfairly. The system enforces laws and the legislative intent
underpinning those laws, period. In a sense, the judicial system is agnostic
about justice and fairness, which are philosophical concepts and subjective
in nature.
Public Choice Theory offers some useful perspective. Mancur Olson,
in his book “The Logic of Collective Action” posited that some groups
have a larger impact on government policies than others.175 In a democratic
system, people with common interests will generally band together to
achieve common goals. However, if the benefits of a political outcome are
concentrated in the hands of a few and the costs are diffused among many,
the beneficiaries are motivated to influence the political process in their
favor. At the same time, those who bear the costs have little incentive to
organize to protect their interests.
The mutual fund industry offers a prime illustration of Olson’s
insights. It is estimated here that the investment management industry
overcharges investors by about $30 billion annually in the form of excess
171. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 471 (1979).
172. Gartenberg v.Merill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 931 (2d Cir. 1982).
173. Schuyt Rowe Price Prime Res. Fund, 663 F.Supp 962,989 n. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
174. Kalish v. Franklin Advisers Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
175. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 127-28 (1965).
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advisory fees. The $30 billion is spread among ninety million investors so
that on average each investor pays about $300 per year in excess fees. Yet
the nine largest investment management firms in Table 3 who collectively
manage about $4 trillion in active assets would each benefit by about $1.5
billion per year, on average. Certainly, the motivation exists for the fund
sponsors to tilt the playing field in their favor.
Investment management industry power and influence were not
limited to the 1970 Amendment to the ICA and subsequent case law.
Brown (2017) explores the regulatory capture of the SEC and the
concomitant deference of the Commission to industry interests.
The late trading and market timing scandals of 2003 led to the Mutual
Fund Reform Act of 2004 that the industry successfully aborted.176 The
comments of the architect of that bill, Senator Peter Fitzgerald, are
especially cogent: “The mutual fund industry is now the world’s largest
skimming operation — a $7 trillion trough from which fund managers,
brokers and other insiders are steadily siphoning off an excessive slice of
the Nation’s household, college, and retirement savings.”177 Since Senator
Fitzgerald made his comments, mutual fund assets have more than doubled
and fund sponsors continue to profit handsomely from the situation, with
no effective regulation by Congress, the SEC, or the courts.
176. See Regulatory Capture, supra note 13 (describing how the investment management
industry has effectively captured the SEC).
177. Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: Hearing Before
the Fin. Mgmt., The Budget, & Int’l Sec. Subcomms. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald).
